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This paper considers those sectors of the economy that operate under the same regimes 
of rewarding private innovators as others, but differ in that they face recurring problems 
of resistance, as occur in the pharmaceutical and agricultural industries. This recurrence 
originates in the natural processes of selection and evolution among humanity’s 
biological competitors. The paper examines the capacity for decentralised patent-based 
incentive mechanisms to result in socially optimal outcomes in these sectors under 
scale- and speed-dependent evolution of pathogens. It demonstrates that there is a 
fundamental incompatibility between the dynamics of the patent system and the 
dynamics of the resistance problem under both types of evolution. Under scale-
dependent evolution, the externalities within a patent-based system indicate that 
decentralised mechanisms will result in systematic underinvestment in R&D that 
decreases further with an increasing severity of the resistance problem. Under speed-
dependent evolution, a patent-based system will fail to target socially optimal 
innovation size. The overall conclusion is that patent-based incentive mechanisms are 
incapable of sustaining society against a background of increasing resistance problems. 
The paper concludes with appropriate policy implications of these results. 
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 1. Introduction 
 
Human interventions within the biological world produce natural responses that automatically 
erode the effectiveness of the initial intervention. This effect is seen in the phenomenon of 
antibiotic resistance in the health context, or in the phenomenon of pest resistance in the 
agricultural context. These responses from nature are predictable and automatic because, when 
we choose to make a biological resource more prevalent than it would otherwise be, we are 
simultaneously selecting higher rates of prevalence for the pests and pathogens that prey upon 
that resource. These pests and pathogens will prosper by reason of our choices, and erode any 
gains from the initial intervention, unless we are able to intervene once again in a way that will 
restore the original gain. Thus, by intervening within the biological world, we are committing 
ourselves to a continuing race of innovation against nature. 
 
Sustaining production in the face of these contests of biological innovation is the essence of the 
task that society assigns to the biotechnological industries. The biotechnology industries do so by 
generating and putting in place solutions to these recurring problems. Just like in any other R&D 
intensive industry, it operates under an innovation reward system based on patents in order to 
provide incentives for innovation. However, in other R&D industries, solutions generated last 
forever since there is no endogenous response to the innovative activity that renders previous 
innovations physically obsolete. This quality of “durability” that solutions in other sectors have 
gives rise to the essentially cumulative nature of technological progress in those sectors and is 
captured in macroeconomic models in terms of a “quality ladder” (Grossman and Helpman 1991). 
In the presence of evolving pests and pathogens, solutions are transient and temporary tools in a 
perpetual race that – metaphorically – appears much more like a treadmill than a ladder. The 
fundamental question is then whether a patent system designed for the world of durable solutions 
is an appropriate system of rewarding private firms for innovations that will not last. The 
analytical framework that we use to address this question builds on the model of “creative 
destruction” devised by Aghion and Howitt (1992). Their model considers the dynamics 
occurring within an industry that is motivated by the pursuit of patent-based rents from 
innovation. This “industrial” race of innovation takes place between industrial competitors, in 
which success is measured by the displacement of a rival’s innovation with one’s own. We 
introduce a second, namely “biological”, race in which innovations are displaced by the 
successful evolution of pathogens. Thus our paper examines the intersection between two distinct 
races of innovation, one biological and one industrial. We examine the interaction between the 
dynamics of the problems of biological resistance and the dynamics of the policies based on 
patent-based incentive mechanisms. The principal enquiry pursued here concerns the use of 
decentralised incentive systems to motivate the pursuit of these objectives. 
 
As indicated above, the Aghion and Howitt framework enables the investigation of the impact of 
atent-based incentive systems on the biotechnology industry. Under patent-based R&D systems, 
firms compete for patents that provide revenue streams until such time as another innovation 
renders that patent obsolete. In the biotechnology industry these patents will be displaced by a 
competitive firm’s creation or a competitive pathogen’s adaptation. How will firms operating 
under a patent system respond to the challenge implied by these biological contests? Are patents 
adequate for targeting the achievement of the gains sought by society? The distinction between 
the social objectives regarding biotechnology and the patent-based incentives to pursue them is 
the focus of this enquiry. 
 
We commence in section 2 with a description of the intersection of the systems of dynamics 
represented by biological problems and patent-based incentives. In section 3 we develop our 
analytical framework, a model of the biotechnology industry and of the dynamics resulting from human intervention. In section 4, we define the social objective with regard to the biotechnology 
sector. Sections 5 through 7 focus on scale-dependent adaptation of pathogens. We first derive the 
social optimality conditions for investment in biotechnology (section 5), then the patent-based 
incentive mechanism for motivating the biotechnology sector (section 6) before identifying the 
failures of a patent-driven system under scale-dependent selection by contrasting the social and 
private optima (section 7). Sections 8 through 10 follow the same structure in the context of 
speed-dependent selection in pathogen populations, deriving the social optimum (section 8) and 
then firm-level choice (section 9) in order to highlight the shortcomings of the patent system 
under this selection process (section 10). In section 11 we discuss some policy implications of the 
demonstrated inadequacy of the incentives for investment in biotechnology under patent systems 
and conclude in section 12. 
 
 
2. Resistance Problems and R&D Policies: The Intersection of Dynamic 
Systems 
 
In this section we describe the dynamic system that evolutionary biologists use to characterise the 
realm within which biotechnology operates, and how this system intersects with the dynamics 
inherent within a patent-based incentive system for innovation. Here biotechnology will refer to 
the use of biological resources as inputs into the research and development for the development 
of solutions to biological problems within the context of evolutionary processes. Biological 
problems are perceived by evolutionary biologists as zero-sum games between competing 
predators. Thus an infestation or infection simply represents the appropriation of a larger share of 
the available surplus by a competing organism. The evolutionary process is the combined result 
of the processes of selection, adaptation and reproduction. Thus the application of a particular 
pesticide or pharmaceutical to a pest population simply selects disproportionately those in the 
population which are resistant to it, resulting in disproportionate reproduction by those resistant, 
and consequently in the observed adaptation of resistance over time. 
 
The biotechnology industries engage in an ongoing contest to solve these biological problems 
against the background of these evolutionary processes. For example, the pharmaceutical industry 
deals with such problems in its research into antibiotics, where it attempts to halt the progress of 
pathogens successfully reproducing themselves within the human population. After application of 
an antibiotic, the industry must then deal with the consequences of selection and adaptation, when 
the pathogen population begins to demonstrate resistance to the antibiotic (Laxminarayan and 
Brown 2001). The agricultural industry deals with such problems in its research into new plant 
varieties, when it attempts to produce new varieties in order to replace those registering declining 
yields. The commercially obsolete plant variety, as host to an increasingly successful pest 
population, is one that is registering the same problem that is preying on the human population in 
the pharmaceutical context. Again, the introduction of the new plant variety induces the responses 
of the pest population by reason of selection and adaptation, and the new variety begins its 
decline (Evans 1993; Scheffer 1997). 
 
This indicates that one unusual characteristic of these sorts of problems is their refusal to go away 
(Munro 1997). When a solution has been ascertained and applied within the biological world, the 
nature of the biological world is such that it will commence immediately to erode the usefulness 
of that application. For empirical examples of this, see table 1 at the back. Adaptation of biota 
(pests and pathogens) to widely-used pharmaceuticals and plants is a “fact of life”, and it implies 
that the widespread use of any biotechnology must necessarily imply its own eventual demise (Weitzmann 1999, Anderson and May 1991). This type of pathogen response is driven by scale of 
application and conforms to well-described laws (Hofbauer and Sigmund 1988). 
 
A second type of pathogen response has received increasing attention in the recent past in the 
context of the release of genetically modified organisms. Here the driving factor is the speed at 
which new technologies are developed and applied. The impact of the speed of innovation on 
pathogen evolution is more speculative and various linkages have been suggested. One possibility 
discussed in the literature is that increasing the pace at which technology proceeds simply 
increases the speed of response by pathogen populations because innovations imply selection 
among competing pathogen populations (Stenseth and Maynard Smith 1984) or competing genes 
(Frank 2000). Widespread and rapid rates of innovation by biotechnologists therefore imply 
widespread and rapid rates of innovation by the pathogens as well. Biologists refer to these as 
Red Queen Contests, in which it is necessary to innovate more and more rapidly merely to 
maintain parity within the contest (Maynard Smith 1976). Another possibility is that increased 
pace of technology slows down the response from the pathogen population as it will take longer 
for successful survival strategies to emerge at the population level. This implies an opposite effect 
of the speed of innovation. Against the background of scale- and speed-dependent responses, the 
meaning of technological progress is much less straightforward. If the widespread use of a 
technological advance must necessarily imply the increasing rate of arrival of problems, then 
what is to be the measure of success? Think of the biotechnology sector as engaged in a race by 
the innovator up the “down” escalator. Then success in the race must be measured relative to 
actual progress up the escalator, not just steps taken by the innovator. Imagine as well that the 
escalator belt runs freely, so that quicker or larger steps by the innovator simply results in 
bringing the stairs down more quickly. Given that individual attempts at progress result in both 
discrete moves forward and an increasing pace of the background contest, the full impact of an 
innovation must be discerned by its aggregate impact across time. It is possible that small initial 
advances might ultimately aggregate into large net losses.  
 
In sum, the biotechnology sector is presented here as that area of human enterprise dedicated to 
the maintenance of the stability of the “biological production sector”, against this background of 
competing organisms continually evolving to introduce new biological problems. It pursues this 
objective by making investments that either a) slow the rate of arrival of biological problems; 
and/or b) increase the rate of arrival of solutions to such problems. One of the primary functions 
of the biotechnology sector is to determine the optimal amount of resources devoted to the 
diverse biological resources that are necessary to achieve these objects (Goeschl and Swanson 
2002, forthcoming). The biotechnology sector is the manager of society’s research and 
development efforts in order to make progress in the contest of biological innovation through the 
appropriate management of biological resources. 
 
Having described the role of the biotechnology sector as that of generating innovations within the 
biological contest, we turn briefly to the role of the industrial contest that motivates the 
biotechnology industry to generate these innovations. The biotechnology sector is motivated by 
the pursuit of limited-term monopolies from the conferment of patents upon its innovations. In 
accordance with patent law, monopolies of a specified duration are allowed for useful innovations 
of a specified magnitude, i.e. representing a certain minimum level of advance. In focusing on 
patent-based mechanisms for motivating decentralised R&D, this paper is related to the literature 
on contests of innovation well known from the theory of industrial organization (Tirole 1988). 
The specific framework adopted here is the model of a sector engaged within a process of 
creative destruction (Aghion and Howitt 1992). Creative destruction is of course Schumpeter’s 
term for the process by which firms innovate against a background of competitive innovation 
within the industry. In this scenario an innovation secures an advance for the firm, but only until such time that another firm within the industry secures an innovation that destroys the usefulness 
of the first. Hence a patent-based incentive mechanism provides the capacity to capture a stream 
of rents from an innovation, but also provides the prospect that that stream of rents may be 
truncated by reason of a competitor’s innovation. 
 
With regard to the industrial contest, the one significant modification that we apply within this 
framework is to incorporate the possibility of another overlaid process of ongoing obsolescence 
deriving from forces within the biological, as opposed to the industrial, world. The stream of rents 
from an innovation may be truncated by reason of a competitive innovation originating in either 
contest, biological or industrial. We term the impacts of the biological contest on the industrial 
innovation contest a process of adaptive destruction. Against this background of creative and 
adaptive destruction, the biotechnology firm must compete to innovate in order to remain within 
the industry. Hence, it is the intersection of the dynamic systems represented by biological 
problems and patent-based policies that generate the ultimate incentives that motivate the 
biotechnology industry. How these unusual dynamics produce outcomes, and how these 
outcomes relate to the ultimate objectives society holds for the sector are the subjects of this 
paper. In the next section we set out the basics of a biotechnology sector, its role in addressing 
biological problems and the contest of biological innovation within which it operates. 
 
 
3. A Model of a Biotechnology Sector 
 
In this section we set out the basics of our approach to modelling a biotechnology sector. In this 
model we are looking at the role of the underlying research and development (R&D) sector that 
sustains the production sector. The biotechnology sector performs this task, explicitly, by 
conducting R&D to provide a flow of necessary innovations to sustain society in the contest of 
biological innovation. Implicitly it is determining the level of investment into R&D, including the 
level of investment of biological resources, and consequently the relative sizes of the production 
and reserve sectors. In between the research and production sectors, there is an intermediate 
goods sector whose sole role is to embody the information developed in the research sector for 
application within the production sector. 
 
In order to render the discussion concrete, we will fix it within the agricultural sector. Within this 
context the base R&D sector is the plant breeding sector of the agricultural industry, and the 
intermediate goods are the registered seeds and high-yielding plant varieties (HYVs) within 
which innovations are embodied.2 The only consumer good resulting from this industry is the 
agricultural output ultimately produced by the application of the intermediate good (HYVs) to the 
lands retained within the production sector.  
 
Plant breeders’ R&D efforts are increasingly addressed to the ongoing problems of pest 
adaptation and resistance.3  Pests and disease now account for average annual crop losses of 
28.9%, increasing with each year of the use of a given plant variety. (Oerke et. al. 1994; Evans 
1993; Scheffer 1997). Plant breeders also engage individually in a contest of innovation against 
one another. Together these contests limit the commercially useful life of any newly introduced 
HYV to between 3 and 7 years. Hence the biotechnology sector underlying agriculture must 
continually innovate in order to address the problem of depreciation occurring within the 
production sector. Agricultural production takes place within an ongoing biological contest 
against continually adapting pests and pathogens. In this contest the plant breeding sector acts as 
society’s innovator and thus determines society’s ability to sustain production within this 
biological contest. As adaptation to existing HYVs occurs, the plant breeding sector must develop new varieties of plants sufficiently innovative to thwart the advance of the prevailing population 
of pests and pathogens. Of course, if it succeeds, its success merely selects another strain of pests 
and pathogens for disproportionate evolutionary success, and the contest begins anew. 
 
 
3.1 Modelling the Role of a Biotechnology Sector 
 
Assume that there is a single consumption good that is generated by a three-tiered production 
system. The final goods sector consists only of production but it is sustained and stabilised by 
decisions made in the underlying R&D sector. The R&D sector generates innovations which are 
embodied in intermediate goods that are then inputs into the production of the final consumption 
goods. Think of the plant breeding sector at the base (the R&D sector) of the crop production 
industry, with the seed producers in the middle (the intermediate good sector) and agricultural 
production in the third tier (the final good sector). All value within the system derives from 




3.1.1 Final Goods Sector 
 
Final good production relies on only two inputs: the intermediate good (seeds) and the natural 
resource (land). Production of the final good occurs under the conditions of a fixed proportions 
production function, such that a fixed amount (β) of the intermediate input (x) is combined with 
each unit of the natural resources input (L). The proportion of the natural resources factor (L) 
allocated to final good production is termed d. 
 
The final goods sector has a production function of the form 
 
) ( t t t x F A y =    (1) 
 
with F(0)=0, Fx>0 and Fxx<0 6 defining a concave production function in C
3. The productivity 
parameter At is determined by the level of technology being employed in the final goods sector at 
time t, and x is the amount of the intermediate good being used in that sector. This function is 
well-defined since, due to the fixed proportions in production, a choice of x uniquely determines 
the optimal allocation of L to this sector, d. 
 
 
3.1.2 Intermediate Goods Sector 
 
The intermediate good sector provides the link between the production sector and the underlying 
R&D sector. It does so through the production of an intermediate good that embodies the 
information produced within the latter, while being an essential input into the former. The actual 
production of the intermediate good exhibits the same type of production function as before. Here 
a unit increase in the amount of L allocated to intermediate good production will generate an 
increase in the production of the intermediate good x proportional to the factor z. The proportion 
of L allocated to intermediate good production will be termed g. Given these assumptions about 








   (2) Therefore, a given level of production of the intermediate input x is always associated with a 
specific allocation of the essential input L  to production, as well as its allocation between 
intermediate and final good production.
7
 The Leontievian structure of production in both the 
intermediate and the final sector can be justified by reference to the actual practice in the 
agricultural industry where there is an optimal fixed input of seed per hectare. It also helps 
abstract from the substitutability between production factors that would otherwise cloud the 
analysis. 
 
This sector is important in this model only in that it affords the biotechnologist the capacity to 
capture the value of its innovations. Intermediate goods (here, seeds) are patented products that 
encapsulate the information generated within the underlying R&D process. Without the 
intermediate good, the production of information in the R&D sector would go unrewarded. We 




3.1.3 The R&D Sector 
 
The R&D sector of the biotechnology industry produces disembodied technological innovations 
through the combination of human and natural resources. These innovations are then fed into the 
intermediate good sector for embodiment, and ultimate use in the production sector. The 
biotechnology industry must attract investment to this stabilisation function. Within this model 
we will be looking at a single factor of production used within both R&D and production sectors, 
viz. the supply of biological resources. A supply of biological resources is necessary for R&D in 
order to generate innovations. Likewise, biological resources are also required for production to 
occur in the production sector. The biotechnology sector’s ability to attract investment will 
determine the relative allocation of these essential resources between the two functions, 
production or R&D.  
 
Figure 1 gives a depiction of the biotechnology sector and its role in this production system. Here 
the biotechnology sector performs R&D and uses the essential natural resource as an input into its 
research activities. Innovations result in new technology that is embodied within patented 
products in the intermediate sector; the intermediate good also requires a small allocation of the 
essential input for production. Finally, the intermediate good is then used in the final goods 
production sector in combination with the essential natural resource in order to produce the goods 
that are marketed to consumers.  
 
























TechnologyHere we will define “Land” as the underlying factor that determines how biological resources will 
be allocated between production and R&D. Land provides agricultural production when allocated 
to the production sector, while providing diverse plant genetic resources when dedicated to non-
production (the “reserve sector”). The problems of interest to us involve the manner in which the 
biotechnology sector will determine the optimal allocation of the natural resource (land) between 
production and R&D. A part of this problem concerns the capacity of patent-based systems for 
providing optimal incentives for the attraction of investments into the biotechnology sector. 
Before we turn to these issues, it will be necessary to define the dynamic structure of the model.  
 
 
3.2 Dynamics - Innovation and Adaptation 
 
We have previously described the dynamics of the biological contest, where innovations induce 
adaptations. Here we specify this contest within the step-climbing context that we used to 
describe it earlier. An innovation represents a step upwards, while an adaptation is standardised as 
a step backwards. The current stage of technology is then a single parameter that captures the 
history of the competition to date as the net of the number of such steps, forwards and backwards. 
 
 
3.2.1 Innovation and Creative Destruction 
 
It is assumed that the timing of innovations flowing from the biotechnology sector follows a 
Poisson process denoted by ø. The frequency of innovations within this process is determined in 
part by the level of investment in research and development (R&D). A distinguishing 
characteristic of biotechnology industries is that they depend in part on supplies of biological 
resources for undertaking the R&D process, and this is the factor of production on which we 
focus. Specifically, it is assumed that the frequency of innovation increases with the proportion 
(v) of the essential input (L) allocated to R&D. Innovations hence arrive at a rate  ø i(v) per time 
period where i(v) i(0)=0, iv>0, is an innovation production function. 
 
The impact of an innovation consists of a discrete shift in the level of productivity in the final 
sector which we denoted in (1) by At. Although this assumption will be relaxed later, assume 
initially that the size of shift is exogenously fixed and that this shift is of magnitude γ>1 such that 
AI+1=AIּγ .
8 The index I denotes the current level of technology in use in final goods production. 
 
We will note for application in later sections that innovations also have a destructive facet to their 
characters within the industrial context. The occurrence of a “technological innovation” is an 
event that renders the currently prevailing technology within the industry obsolete, i.e. 
innovations in this model are "drastic".
9 Hence each act of creation is an act of destruction with 
regard to the usefulness of all previous innovations. Under a patent system, this is equivalent to 
stating that an “innovation” is defined to be only that amount of technological change sufficient 
to warrant patent protection. We will standardise innovation at this magnitude, in order to provide 
a standard measure of innovation with which to compare technological progress across various 
systems of organisation. Hence we will measure aggregate technological change as the sum of the 
number of discrete “steps” of innovation of the minimum length required to acquire a patent. 
 
 
3.2.2 Innovation and Adaptive Destruction 
 
As discussed above, the biotechnology sector has the unusual characteristic that the application of 
its innovations within the production sector results in an induced response in the form of “biological innovations” by pathogens. In this paper, we consider both scale and speed-driven 
responses. These responses will then render the innovation obsolete, a process we termed 
“adaptive destruction”. The impact of a biological innovation is to reduce the economic 
productivity of the final goods sector - by eliminating the gains that were generated by the 
adoption of the current technology. Previous models describing the process of scale-driven 
endogenised response have cast this mechanism in the equations of frequency-dependent 
selection arising out of the biological literature (Laxminarayan and Brown 2001, Munro 1997, 
Mangel 1985). Here we allow for a more general type of relationship between scale of technology 
application and speed of adaptation that also reflects the stochastic nature of the process. 
Analytically, we model the dynamic process of biological innovations forced by selection 
pressure as a Poisson process represented by λ.
10  In purely scale-dependent selection, the 
frequency of innovation increases with the use of the intermediate input that embodies the current 
technology in accordance with an induced evolution function a(x), a(0)=0, ax>0.
11  Hence, 
pathogens adapt to and overcome current technologies at a rate of λa(x).
12 In speed-dependent 
selection, the frequency of adaptations is also influenced by the step size of innovations. In this 
case, we write the induced evolution function as a(x, λ) and the resultant rate of innovation as 
λa(x,γ). Possible functional relationships between step size γ and induced evolution are discussed 
later.  
 
As indicated above, the rate and extent of adaptation depends on the rate and extent of uniform 
adoption of the innovation. Since we have assumed that innovations are “drastic”, this means that 
a technological innovation displaces all other competitors from use throughout the final goods 
sector. Then the extent of use of the innovation will depend only on the relative size of the 
production sector (relative to the reserve sector). Thus, the only limitation on the use of the 
intermediate good (x) will be the extent of the reserve sector (v), and we can equivalently express 
the function determining the rate of biological innovation as a function of the size of the reserve 
sector. A “biological innovation” is normalised so that a single innovation eliminates the relative 
advantage of the current technology.




 Thus, with D 
denoting the stage of biological innovations (i.e. depreciation), AD+1= ADּγ 
−1. This implies that 




3.2.3. The Net State of Technology 
 
These two processes of innovation and adaptation jointly determine the current state of 
productivity (A)  within the final goods sector. Each technological innovation that occurs 
represents a positive shift in sector productivity, while each biological innovation represent a 
negative shift. With s denoting the current technological stage given a history of innovations and 





I-D     (3) 
 
Equation (3) therefore describes the current state of technology in use in the final goods sector as 
a single parameter expressing the history or aggregate impact of the contests of creative and 
adaptive destruction. Progress in the production sector in the sense of absolute improvements in 
productivity occurs only to the extent that the number of technological innovations exceeds the 
number of biological ones. 
 
 4. The Social Objective for Biotechnology 
 
We commence by assuming that society consists of a continuum of individuals of mass 1, each 
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In this representation of the problem the individuals concerned are giving no direct consideration 
to the costs of instability, uncertainty or risk. The individuals in this society value only the flow 
of consumption goods from the final production sector, with no inherent value given to the 
products of the R&D sector. This social objective creates a role for an intermediate goods sector, 
in which R&D outputs are embodied, and it makes clear that any increase in production will be 
considered equally valuable.
17
 Hence the decision problem with which we are concerned is the 
optimal allocation of natural resources (land) in the pursuit of the objective of maximum 
production. The importance of sustainability within this objective will be inferred from the need 
to maintain production against the background of pathogen adaptation. 
 
Noting that the total amount of land will be allocated between the various sectors of this industry, 
this implies the existence of the constraint (for L=1):  
 
1 = v + d + g    (5) 
 
Equation (5) implies that the processes governing both creative and adaptive destruction can be 
rewritten as functions of the reserve size v only. From (3) and (5) follows that x=(1-v)/(β+z) such 
that a(x) can be expressed as a(v) with av<0. We now need to incorporate the concepts of creative 
and adaptive destruction within the model. We use the probability distributions Π(I,t)  (the 
probability of I  technological innovations by the time t  ) and Π(D,t)  (the probability of D 
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We are now in a position to set out the social objective for a biotechnology sector. As shown in 
the appendix, we can combine the expressions (1) – (7) and aggregate to re-state the social 
objective of maximum production as follows: 
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   (8) 
 
The societal objective is to maximise the social welfare function (8) by choosing the proportion 
(v) of the essential input (L) to be allocated to R&D, subject to the constraint (5) and under the 
assumption of innovation size being a choice variable by choosing γ. This objective contains the 
race of innovation within it. As represents the current state of technology, which is generated by 
the history of past innovations. The probability distributions indicate the current period’s contest, i.e. the number of innovations and adaptations occurring within that period. Production is the 
product of both the net state of technology generated by the race (represented by As) and the 
amount of land that is dedicated to production. Thus the re-stated objective intimates the trade-off 
between investing biological resources into production or into innovation. 
 
We are able to see the explicit nature of the trade-offs involved by means of integrating equation 
(8) over real time and making use of (4); the appendix shows how to arrive at the following 
expression for the present value of social welfare from the allocation of this input between these 
sectors. 
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where F(•) is F[β
−1(1-v-g)] and av<0 from (5). 
 
Equation (9) captures the differentiated roles of the production and R&D sectors in generating 
social welfare over time. The impact on output from the allocation of lands to the production 
sector is denoted in the numerator, while the impact from allocation of lands toward the R&D 
sector is captured in the denominator. In simplest terms, the choice of the size of the production 
sector determines the initial level of production, while allocations of resources to the R&D sector 
determine the growth path of production. The role of the biotechnology sector is then seen to be 
the determination of the trajectory of welfare generated within the production sector, by 
sustaining the sector in the biological contest.  
 
The numerator exhibits a straightforward impact from increased land in production in that 
reducing v benefits the output in the final sector. The denominator gives a sort of “own discount 
rate of biodiversity” that has to be applied to determine the value of the perpetuity that is the flow 
of final sector output over the infinite time horizon. It is a composite of the social rate of time 
preference (r) reduced
18
 by the rate of technological innovation, φ i(v), and increased
19
 by the rate 
of biological innovation λa(v). 
 
This own discount rate captures the expected impact of the contest of innovation between the 
biotechnology sector and the biological world. There are really three cases. If the sector is 
successful in maintaining innovation rates significantly in excess of adaptations, then the own 
discount rate may approach zero, implying a substantial multiplier on initial production levels. 
This is the case where the growth trajectory is very steep. Conversely, if the biotechnology sector 
is very unsuccessful, the number of adaptations will follow closely the number of innovations and 
the growth trajectory will be flat. In the extreme, the production system is unsustainable with 
adaptations exceeding innovations. Finally, there is the situation in which the biotechnology 
sector is in a closely-contested Red Queen race, in which it attempts to make advances against the 
background of a system always responding to depreciate those gains. 
 
From equation (9) a number of policy-relevant propositions result. We first examine the limiting 
cases of allocating land to the reserve sector in terms of their implications for welfare. 
 
PROPOSITION  1: If all land is converted to use in the final production sector, social welfare 
converges to zero. 
 PROOF: Total conversion of land into intensive use implies that the share of land allocated to the 
final sector, x, is one. From x=1 follows that all reserve lands are converted such that v=0. Taking 
the limit of equation (9) with respect to v→ 0, we get 
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An allocation that does not result in a positive size for reserves implies an intrinsic discount rate 
of infinity. The intuition is that the expected rate of biological adaptation rises to infinity in such a 
setting, implying practically immediate obsolescence of production technologies and no 
generation of further innovations. 
 
PROPOSITION  2: As the reserve sector expands to the total available land, social welfare 
converges to zero. 
 
PROOF: Taking the limit of equation (9) with respect to v→1, we get 
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An allocation that does not allocate land to productive use denies consumptive utility to society 
and hence results in no welfare creation in the economy. Land in intensive use is therefore 
necessary to generate instantaneous returns to land assets. 
 
Propositions 1 and 2 together suggest that the optimal solution to the allocation problem entails 
putting some amount of land into productive use while balancing the dynamic problems arising in 
this area through a reserve sector. We believe that, in the long run, this is the correct way in 
which to view the role of the biotechnology sector. It is the sector responsible for attaining and 
maintaining small amounts of relative advantage within a contest of biological adaptation. 
 
 
5. The Optimal Allocation of Resources to the Biotechnology Sector under 
scale dependent selection 
 
What is the optimal allocation of resources (i.e. land) to the biotechnology sector? Solving (9) for 
the optimal level of v, we get the following expression for the socially optimal level of investment 
in the biotechnology sector. 
 
PROPOSITION 3: The allocation of resources to the biotech sector is socially optimal where the 
gross marginal loss in production (including intermediate production) through additional land in 
reserves equals the net present value of the net increase in productivity in the final goods sector 
generated by the reserve sector. 
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at the optimum with F(•) = F[ β
-1(1-v-g)].
21The RHS of equation (10) is the cost of moving the 
last unit of land out of productive use into the reserve sector and thus measures the loss in 
production. The LHS is the benefit of adding a unit of land to the reserve sector in terms of 
productivity increases. Note that the net present value of productivity increases in the final goods 
sector referred to in proposition 3 is determined by the marginal increase in the rate of arrival of 
innovations and the marginal reduction in the rate of biological innovation that result from 
expanding the reserve sector and – as a result – reducing the final sector.
22 
 
The own discount rate applied is -as discussed below - the composite rate used by the social 
planner which takes into account the rates of technological and biological innovation.
23
 In short, 
the trade-off is between an initially increased level of production versus a perpetual increase in 
the rate of growth. To see this, consider equation (9). This expression defines an expected 
expansion path for final output in the economy along the path [ ] γ γ λ φ ln *) ( *) (
1 − − v a v i . This 
path is unambiguously increasing in R&D investments (v). Any small advantage acquired in the 
current period’s contest of innovation may be warranted by reason of the change in path that it 
implies. 
 
Biotechnology here is seen to be an industry that determines the relative weights that society will 
give to the goals of production versus stabilisation within the biological sector. In order to do so, 
it implicitly determines the relative allocations of resources to the “production” and “diversity” 
sectors that are required to implement those goals. As in Weitzman (2000), the threat of 
unsustainability of this industry may be viewed as the choice of any path that might lead 
ultimately towards zero production. More generally, the problem of optimal biotechnology 
investment may be seen to be any decision that places the sector on a path with inadequate rates 
of innovation.  
 
Propositions 3 determines the socially optimal solution to the problem of choosing a development 
path in the presence of pathogen adaptations in the final sector that occur in response to the scale 
of application. In reality, decision-makers in biotechnological companies choose this path based 
on the incentives prevailing in the industry in a decentralised fashion. These incentives and their 
impact on industry choices are the subject of the following section. 
 
 
6. Firm Decision Making under scale-dependent selection 
 
A decentralised R&D industry requires substantial policy intervention to be operable. This is 
because the benefits generated from investments in R&D are usually inappropriable or very 
inexactly appropriable, and this leads to suboptimal levels of investment in R&D (Arrow 1962). 
One policy response to this problem is the creation of a regime of monopoly rights in the 
marketing of intermediate goods that embody some of this information, e.g. patent rights. As 
those in other sectors of the economy, innovations in the biotechnology industry are rewarded 
using the same regime of patents. Here, we examine the incentives created by a patent system for 
investment in biotechnological innovations, initially under the assumption that the size of 
innovations is fixed. The question is: How will a private biotechnology firm within an industry of 
the type described above respond to the incentives to invest in R&D? To answer this question, we 
explore how an individual firm in pursuit of a patent in the intermediate good sector will 
approach the same decision faced by the social planner in the previous section, i.e. the allocation 
of an essential input between the R&D and production sectors.  
  
6.1. Patent-based Profits in the Intermediate Good Market 
 
The initial question concerns the magnitude of the rewards to be obtained through innovation. 
What is the level of the profits obtainable by the patent holder in the intermediate goods sector? 
Firms in possession of a patent have the capacity to choose the optimal level of output for the 
intermediate good embodying the patented technology. As we are assuming a perfectly 
competitive final goods sector, the optimal amount of good x produced is the level of output that 
maximises revenues minus the cost of producing the intermediate good on land g(x), where land 
commands the price p per unit. 
 
] ) ( ) ( max[ arg gx x p x x F A x x s s − =
∗  ( 11) 
 
In the context of an industry with an effective monopsony over the use of the essential input, the 
price of that factor may be endogenised.
24 Then the monopolist would take into consideration the 
effect of its intermediate output decision on the demand for land generated by the final and 
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6.2. Private Firm’s Investment in R&D 
 
What are the investment incentives for firms in pursuit of these monopoly rents? Assume that 
there are n firms in this sector of the economy of which one will be holding a patent for the 
current technology. It is known that the balancing condition for investment is that at the margin 
the expected profits generated by investment in R&D must equal the opportunity cost of capital 
(Kamien and Schwartz 1982). Hence, taking into account the expected obsolescence of 
technological innovations (by reason of the processes of both creative and adaptive destruction), 
each firm that is not currently producing the intermediate good faces the R&D balancing 
condition that 
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This condition states that the expected return on the next innovation (the RHS) has to equal the 
opportunity cost of capital on the LHS. The expected return consists of the monopolistic profits 
from selling the intermediate good embodying the innovation to the final goods sector in the 
future technological stage minus the expected impact from obsolescence of the technology due to 
technological innovations made by one of the (n-1) competitors minus the expected impact from 
obsolescence of the technology due to biological innovation. Note that we assume that 
technologies of the previous technological stage are supplied competitively, implying a zero-profit condition on technologies of earlier vintage. Rearranging (14) and making use of (3), we 
get the net present value of a single technological innovation 
 













   ( 15) 
 
In this expression the numerator represents the monopolistic profits generated by the innovation 
and the denominator represents the own rate of discount for private investments in innovative 
activities. This is a composite rate made up of the opportunity cost of capital, the rate of 
obsolescence due to (others’) technological innovation and the rate of obsolescence due to 
biological innovation. In sum, the private firm only values the monopoly rents that may be 
acquired from a technological innovation, and it discounts any future stream of such rents with 
regard to the expectation of any future technological and biological innovation. 
 
 
6.3. Firm Decision Making Regarding Investment in R&D 
 
We now wish to derive the private firm analogue to equation (10) above – the private incentives 
for investment in reserves for purposes of R&D. Land will be allocated by the patent holder in 
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where F(•) is F[ β




Combining (4) with (15) and (16) and solving for the steady state and using (5) to simplify, we 
derive the optimality condition for the private firm’s allocation of land to the reserve sector in the 
steady state of a decentralised economy. 
 
PROPOSITION 4: The allocation of resources to the biotech sector is optimal for a private firm 
where the marginal loss in final production through additional land in reserves equals the private 
net present value of the gross marginal increase in monopolistic rents in the final goods sector 
generated by the reserve sector. 
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As in (10), the LHS of (17) shows the marginal value of land allocated to production, although in 
the present case of private allocation the demand for land in the intermediate sector is neglected. 
The RHS the marginal value of land allocated to reserve status.
27
 The marginal value of lands as 
reserves is equal to the expected value of monopoly rents accruing to the successful innovator by 
reason of the allocation of an additional unit of land to R&D, discounted at the private firm rate that includes not only the opportunity cost of capital but also the anticipated effects of patent 
obsolescence (deriving from either the processes of creative or adaptive destruction). 
 
Sections 5 and 6 present the socially optimal and the privately optimal incentives for investment 
in R&D in the biotechnology industry. It is immediately clear that the social and private 
optimality conditions contained in equations (10) and (17) are not identical. A full analysis of the 
differences is presented in (Goeschl and Swanson 2002, forthcoming). In the following section, 
we explore one implication of the differences in the optimality criteria of industry and society that 
represents a key failure of the patent system to align industry choice with the social optimum. 
 
 
7. Failures of the Patent-Based Incentives for R&D under scale-dependent 
response 
 
Now that we have derived the alternative decision making rules for social and patent-based 
decision making regarding resistance problems, it is possible to compare how these alternative 
decision making systems respond to the fundamental determinants of resistance problems. These 
are fully discussed in (Goeschl and Swanson 2002, forthcoming). What is of interest here is the 
performance of the patent system of rewarding innovations with respect to the fundamental 
problem in biotechnology, namely the recurrence of problems through endogenous adaptation. 
The following proposition demonstrates that this performance is problematic. 
 
PROPOSITION 5: Under the criterion of social optimum, an increased rate of adaptation requires 
increased allocation of resources to R&D. Under a patent regime, an increased rate of adaptation 
leads to reduced allocation of resources to R&D by industry. 
 
PROOF: Proposition 5 can be easily proved through the comparative statics of equations (10) and 
(17). Taking the partial derivatives of (10) with respect to the variables specified, we see that the 
socially optimal amount of investment in biotechnology increases with (i) a decrease in the 
discount rate r, (ii) an increase in the magnitude of the impact of an innovation γ, (iii) an increase 
in the arrival rate of technological innovations φ and (iv) – critically - an increase in the arrival 
rate of biological innovations λ.
28 Conversely, the optimal level of investment by the individual 
biotechnology firm responding to patent-based incentives increases with (i) a decrease in the 
discount rate r, (ii) an increase in the magnitude of the impact of an innovations γ, (iii) an 
increase in the arrival rate of technological innovations φ, and (iv) – again critically - a decrease 
in the arrival rate of biological innovations λ. 
 
The comparative statics show – unsurprisingly - that a higher discount rate leads to a lower 
present value of the benefits of innovation and hence of the inputs that generate these innovations 
both for industry and for society as a whole. Likewise for society, if the step size of technological 
innovation increases, innovation becomes relatively more profitable, which leads to increased 
investment in reserves. For industry, increased step size means that monopoly rents are likely to 
accrue over longer time periods, thus raising the benefits associated with R&D, although the 
impact is less straightforward since competitors also gain from this increase which affects 
expected monopoly rents in an adverse manner.
29 
 
An increase in the arrival rate of innovations improves the profitability of the R&D sector. This 
shifts allocation of reserves towards the R&D sector as the sacrifice in current consumption is 
outweighed by the gains from a higher growth trajectory. With respect to discount rate, 
innovation size and rate of technological innovation, the direction of response of industry and society to changes in the parameters is essentially the same, even though they will differ in terms 
of magnitude (Goeschl and Swanson 2002). However, the response of society and industry to an 
increase in the rate of response from pathogen, an indicator of the severity of the problem of 
recurrence, is opposite. Investment in R&D is society’s instrument for responding to biological 
innovations, and so the marginal benefits from R&D will increase as the rate of biological 
innovation increases.
30  From industry’s perspective, when biological innovations are more 
frequent, then patents become obsolete more quickly, thus providing reduced incentives for 
investments. Increasing rates of adaptation imply reduced time horizons for product usefulness, 
and hence a truncated flow of future benefits. The industry will see reduced incentives to 
investing in the solution of problems, if the expected life of that solution is reduced, and so a 
patent-based system is ill-suited to the problem of adaptive pathogen response and recurrence .  
 
How serious is this problem? That is, what is it that would cause the rates of biological innovation 
to increase? The fundamental nature of adaptation problems is such that an increasing rate of 
biological innovation is a given, as it results from any attempts by society to make progress. 
Society pursues growth in production through either increased allocations of biological resources 
to the production sector, or via increased rates of innovation. Either approach results in increased 
rates of biological innovation. Increased areas of land dedicated to production result in increased 
prospects for any given biological innovation taking hold. Increasing numbers of technological 
innovations increase the number of different pathogens that are implicitly selected by society for 
possible trial. For this reason biotechnological processes are usually modelled as a form of “arms 
race”: an increasing rate of response from the competitor is induced by any attempt to gain an 
advantage.  
 
IPR systems are very poor mechanisms for providing incentives in such contests of innovation. 
The induced response from nature implies an expectation that any innovation’s lifespan will be 
short, and this reduces the incentives to invest in innovation from the outset. If, for some reason, 
society does make an initial attempt to achieve growth in production in the biological sphere, the 
IPR system provides an increasingly diminishing incentive to attempt to remain within the contest 
of innovation that results. Just as society becomes reliant on the biotechnology sector to address 
the resulting problems, the biotechnology sector becomes increasingly less motivated to pursue 
those problems. Innovation and adaptation do not only depend in the scale of innovation, but also 
on the second component determining the absolute rate of productivity development, namely the 
size of innovations. We now explore the implications of generalizing the results in this direction. 
 
 
8. Socially optimal choices under speed-dependent selection 
 
As the preceding analysis has shown, the fact that the processes of innovation and adaptation 
depend on the scale of application has significant implications for the optimal allocation of land 
to production and stabilisation. In this section, we generalise the previous results by considering 
linkages between the innovation and adaptation processes. These linkages introduce a selection 
mechanism into the model that depends on the speed of technological progress. This speed is 
captured in the step size of productivity increases between two sequential technological stages. 
The presence of these linkages is at present speculative and their nature likely to be complex as 
speed-dependent selection is ultimately associated with multi-population models with 
competition for resources (Hofbauer and Sigmund 1988). However their potential presence and 
general nature has significant ramifications for the optimal design of an IPR system to generate 
such innovations as the following analysis shows. 
 
 8.1. Technological expectations 
 
In the following section, we explore the implications of both the innovation and the adaptation 
function being dependent not only on the reserve size (and by implication on the size of 
technology application), v, but also on the size of the technological innovation, γ. Remember that 
so far, this shift parameter was determined exogenously. Removing this condition means on the 
one hand that innovators can choose the size of the innovation and on the other that the response 
of pathogens may itself vary with the innovation size. 
 
Analytically then, we can describe the innovation function as iø(v,γ) and the adaptation function 
as λa(v,γ). We look primarily at the adaptation function as the more interesting case.  
 
ASSUMPTION  1: The function a(v,γ)  depends on the long-run magnitude of γ in a stationary 
equilibrium. 
 
This assumption is in keeping with the focus on stationary equilibria and simplifies the analysis. 
We discuss what violating assumption 1 might imply at a later point.  
 
We now make two possible, but mutually exclusive assumptions about possible linkages between 
innovation size and rate of response. We restrict ourselves to “nicely behaved” linkages, i.e. 
continuous and differentiable functions. although one could readily think of more complex 
linkages.  
 
ASSUMPTION 2: aγ(v,γ)<0. 
 
This assumption spells out the first of two basic possibilities, namely that the response rate of 
pathogens will decrease ceteris paribus as the size of innovations increases. This formulation can 
be justified by reference to pathogens having to face unfamiliar types of ecological conditions, 
thus diminishing the probability that pathogens find a solution rapidly. If the race against 
pathogens can be ultimately won by a sufficiently radical innovation, then aγγ(v,γ)<0 and a(v,γ)=0 
for some very large γ. If not, increased innovation size merely serves to delay that response as an 
increasing (aγγ(v,γ)<0) or decreasing (aγγ(v,γ)>0) function of innovation size.  
 
ASSUMPTION 3: aγ(v,γ)>0. 
 
The second possible linkage between innovation size and rate of adaptation is one where an 
increase in innovation size triggers an accelerated response from pathogens. One explanation 
would be that greater step size in innovations favours more rapidly adapting pathogens within the 
pathogen population that would otherwise be held in check by more slowly evolving competitors. 
This introduces a second level of selection pressure into the model, namely one that selects 
among pathogens at the level of absolute speed of adaptation. Again, two variations of this 
linkage can be distinguished, one where the effect of this additional selection process decreases 
with increasing size of innovation, i.e. aγγ(v,γ)<0, and one where this effect as accelerating, i.e. 
aγγ(v,γ)>0. 
 
The four cases discussed above lay out possibilities regarding the linkage between rate of 
adaptation in pathogens and innovation size. With respect to the innovation function, the 
conventional assumption is that - all other things equal - the probability of an innovation is a 
decreasing function of target size, i.e. iγ(v,γ)<0 and iγγ(v,γ)<0. We discuss a possible variation of 
this assumption in biotechnology at a later point.  
 
8.2. Social value of innovations under speed-dependent response 
 
What are the implications of innovation size being a choice parameter on the social value of 
innovations? The first point to note is that innovation size will now be chosen such that it 
maximises the net present value of the biotechnological sector. The social planner will choose to 
maximise expression (9) by choosing the correct innovation size, γ. From equation (9) it is clear 
that the optimal size, γ*, will be such that it maximises the following expression 
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as the solution to the optimal choice problem. The LHS of equation (19) is the marginal change in 
the rate of innovation with respect to innovation size, which consists of the positive effect of a 
greater size of innovation on the absolute rate of progress and of the negative effect of greater 
innovation size on the probability of arrival. The RHS is the marginal change in the rate of 
adaptation-driven productivity losses. This consists of two effects: The first is the positive effect 
of greater size of innovation on the absolute rate of productivity loss in the final sector, λa(•)γ
-2. 
The second is the effect of a greater size of innovation on the speed of response by pathogens, 
λaγ(•)(γ-1)γ
-1. The direction of this effect depends on the sign of aγ(•)  depends on whether 
assumption 2 or 3 holds and it is through this second effect that the assumptions enter. 
 
It will be convenient to define a benchmark size of innovations for comparison. We take as a 
benchmark the optimal size of innovations in the absence of biological adaptations. 
 
PROPOSITION 6 (Aghion and Howitt 1998): In the absence of adaptations, there exists a unique 
socially optimal innovation size γΒ such that ø[i(•)+iγ(•)(γB-1)=0 
 
PROOF: See Aghion and Howitt (1998). 
 
In the absence of adaptations, the LHS of equation (19) is zero. Since the innovation function is 
concave in the size of innovations under conventional assumptions, a unique solution for the 
optimality ø[i(•)+iγ(•)(γB-1)=0 can be shown to exist. This optimum is our benchmark value of 
innovation size, γΒ, against which we will compare the optima in the presence of adaptation. 
 
How do adaptations affect optimal innovation size? The general tendency in the presence of 
adaptations is to depress the optimal size of innovations such that γ*<γB. The reason for this lies 
in the first-order effect of innovation size on the absolute rate of productivity loss, λa(•) γ
-2. 
However, this first-order effect can be dominated by second-order effects working through the 
marginal impact on the response time, aγ. This means that for aγ sufficiently small, innovation 
size under adaptation exceed that under no adaptation, or that γ*>γB. Since γ<1  implies a 
decreasing growth path over time, we only consider equilibria for γ≥1. The following four cases 
result: PROPOSITION 7.1: If RHS>LHS for all γ≥1, then γ*→∞. 
 
PROOF: Assume RHS>LHS for all γ≥1, then the expression (18) is continuously increasing in 
γ and is therefore maximised for γ→∞. For RHS>LHS to arise, necessary conditions are that aγ<0 
and aγγ(γ)<0. 
 
PROPOSITION 7.2: If RHS<LHS for all γ≥1, then γ*<1. 
 
PROOF: Assume RHS<LHS for all γ≥1, then expression (18) is continuously decreasing in γ and 
is therefore maximised for γ<1. For RHS<LHS to arise, necessary conditions are that aγ>0 and 
aγγ>0. 
 
PROPOSITION 7.3: If RHS=LHS for some γ≥1 and a(•)<- aγ(•)γ*(γ*-1), then γ*>γB. 
 
PROOF: If RHS=0, then γ*=γB. If RHS<0, we know from the concavity of the LHS that for an 
innovation size to solve equation (19), it needs to be greater than γB, hence γ*>γB. For RHS<0, 
a(•)γ
-2+ aγ(•)γ
-1(γ*-1)<0  has to hold and proposition 7.3 follows. A necessary condition for 
Proposition 7.3 to hold is aγ<0. 
 
PROPOSITION 7.4: If RHS=LHS for some γ≥1 and a(•)>- aγ(•)γ*(γ*-1), then γ*<γB. 
 
PROOF: This is the converse of the proof for proposition 7.3. 
 
Figure 1 graphically characterizes the optimal choice of innovation size established under 
propositions 7.1 to 7.4. The benchmark size γB is situated where the function I denoting the LHS 
of expression (19) intersects with the x-axis. This is the optimal innovation size in the absence of 
adaptation, setting the marginal impact of innovation size on the absolute rate of productivity 
growth equal to zero. 
 
Start with the graph illustrating proposition 7.1: This is the case of increasing innovation size 
delaying pathogen response at ever greater rate. In this case, maximum innovation size should be 
targeted as there are essentially increasing returns to size-driven productivity growth. As 
discussed in section 8.1., one realistic variant of this scenario is the assumption of “winnability” 
in that adaptation will cease above a certain innovation size, thus resulting effectively in a 
backstop technology. Then this finite innovation size should optimally be targeted. 
 
 




Graph P7.2 demonstrates the case of increasing innovation size accelerating pathogen response at 
ever greater rate due to the response rate being convex in γ. Here even small steps are assumed to 
trigger significant increases in the rate of adaptation in pathogen. Here the optimal steady-state 
strategy is to cease productivity-enhancing R&D due to the net present loss resulting from 
subsequent pathogen responses. 
 
In case of graph P7.3, pathogen rate of response is negatively related to innovation size, although 
not at a sufficiently increasing rate (for a comparison, see graph P7.1). Here the derivative of 
adaptation rate with respect to innovation size, aγ(•), is sufficiently small (or large in absolute terms) to outweigh the first order effect of increased innovation size, but does not get small 
enough to prevent an equilibrium size. This implies increasing the optimal size of innovation to 
be targeted in the R&D process to γ2*, which lies above the benchmark value due to the 
additional dynamic benefits that arise out of delaying pathogen innovation. 
 
As explained before, because of the first-order effect of innovation size on the rate of net 
productivity growth in the presence of adaptations, under many specifications a finite size of 
innovations γ* will be optimal that is below the benchmark value γB. This general result can arise 
under both positive and negative gradients of the adaptation function with respect to innovation 
size. Graph P7.4 illustrates the case of a positive gradient that follows proposition 7.4 Here 
response time decreases with innovation size, but at a decreasing rate. This results in an optimal 
size γ1* that is smaller than that chosen in the absence of adaptation γΒ as there is a dynamic 
penalty on a greater step size. 
 
We conclude from the analysis of the linkage between innovation size and rate of adaptation that 
the optimal size of innovations in the presence of adaptation will differ from the optimal size in 
its absence (the benchmark value). Whether the size is above or below the benchmark critically 
depends on the assumptions about the adaptation function. In general, the optimal innovation size 
will tend to be below the benchmark value, highlighting the negative impact of biological 
adaptations on the optimal growth path of the final sector. However, if pathogens react negatively 
to size of innovations, an innovation size greater than the benchmark is optimal. If evolutionary 
response is highly sensitive to innovation size (cases 7.1 and 7.2), the possibility of zero and 
infinite steady-state target size being optimal clearly exists. 
 
A final consideration in this analysis concerns the conventional assumptions about the innovation 
function and its dependence on innovation size. These are that probability of innovation decreases 
in innovation size at an increasing marginal cost. Although realistic, in the domain of 
biotechnology another assumption may need to be considered, namely that of the probability of 
innovation being invariant to the size of the innovation.
32
 Biotechnology nowadays affords the 
possibility of exchanging useful genetic information across species boundaries at essentially the 
same cost as within. If the “size” of the innovation is measured on the basis of a biological metric 
such as the genetic distance between two crops and correlates with productivity impacts, then 
biotechnology may be able to evade the decreasing marginal returns usually expected in 
innovation. In that case, ιγ(v,γ)=0 is a distinct possibility and the function I in figure 1 is bounded 
away from the x-axis. In the absence of adaptations, this implies the optimal innovation size 
converging to positive infinity. When adaptation is present, it reduces the analysis of optimal size 
to two extreme cases. In the first, the optimal innovation size would remain infinitely large even 
in the presence of adaptation. This holds for all specifications developed in graphs P7.1, P.7.3 and 
P.7.4. However, a non-concave innovation function does not alter the conclusions reached under 
proposition 7.2. Despite the increasing returns to investment into innovation size, the optimal 
steady-state innovation size remains below one. This is the second case. 
 
In the following section we contrast the sensitivity of the optimal social choice of innovation size 
with the response of private industry to the link between innovation size and adaptation. 
 
 
9. Firm Decision Making under speed-dependent response 
 
As before, we consider innovation and adaptation functions to depend on innovation size γ, 
although here the context is that of a patent-driven industry rather than that of society. The starting point in this analysis is the net present value of an innovation expressed in equation (15), 
previously developed for the case of scale-dependent selection. Allowing for a linkage between 
innovation size and innovation and adaptation function, we can re-express equation (15) as: 
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As in the previous analysis, we only consider stationary equilibria with positive growth and 
follow the conventional assumptions about i(v,γ). Again, we define as a benchmark the case in the 
absence of adaptation. Here the firm takes the following-period profits as given and the 
individually optimal amount of investment fulfils the condition in equation (16) modified for the 
endogenous choice of innovation size such that 
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The profit-maximizing choice of innovation size γP is such that 
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Comparing expression (22) with the social optimum in equation (19) gives rise to proposition (6). 
 
PROPOSITION 8 (Aghion and Howitt, 1998): In the absence of adaptation, the privately optimal 
innovation size γP  smaller than the socially optimal size γB. 
 
PROOF: See (Aghion and Howitt, 1998). 
 
The intuition is that by concavity of the innovation function i(v,γ), the solution to the LHS of 
equation (19) lies on the decreasing part of the function γi(v,γ) and thus to the right of the solution 
to equation (22). This implies in the absence of adaptation under-investment into the step size of 
productivity growth. How does industry choice change when we introduce speed-dependent 
selection? 
 
PROPOSITION 9: Industry choice is invariant to speed-dependent response. 
 
PROOF: If assumption 1 holds (i.e. if the adaptive response is determined by stationary value of 
γ), then any firm in the industry will take VI+1 as given.
33
 Since the adaptation function does not 
enter into the optimality condition in expression (21), the optimal choice of γ is determined by 
expression (22) alone. Hence firm-level choice is invariant to the linkage between innovation size 
and rate of adaptation. The functional dependence of the adaptation function on the step-size of 
innovation arises only at the aggregate level of the industry through the effective discount rate on 
patent rents. 
 
Comparing firm-level choice captured in (21) and (22) with the social optimum defined by 
expression (19), the shortcomings of a patent-driven system under speed-dependent response 
become apparent. 
 10. Failures of the Patent-Based Incentives for R&D under speed-
dependent pathogen response 
 
The failures of patent-based R&D incentives under speed-dependent response arise out of its 
inability to influence the targeting of innovation size by firms in line with the linkage between 
step size and the rate of pathogen response. They can be made explicit by contrasting private 
choice with the social optima defined by expression (19) and the resultant range of socially 
optimal choices for innovation size that are laid out in propositions 7.1 to 7.4. 
 
Since firm-level choice is invariant to the presence of speed-dependent pathogen response, the 
prevailing size of innovation targeted by firms will be γP as derived in expression (22) and will be 
smaller than γB, the benchmark size of the social optimum (proposition 8). Since γ* will differ 
from γB in the presence of speed-dependent adaptation, the following statements can be made 
about the relationship between the private optimum γP and the social optimum γ*: 
 
PROPOSITION 10.1: If γ*→∞, then firms will target insufficient innovation size. 
 
PROOF: Equation (22) defines a finite optimum for γP  under conventional assumptions about 
i(v,γ). From this follows that γP<γ*. 
 
PROPOSITION 10.2: If γ*<1, then firms will target excessive innovation size. 
 
PROOF: Any “discovery” with a productivity effect γ<1 is productivity decreasing since it would 
imply a technological state At+1= γAt <At. In a competitive market, demand for such a “discovery” 
is obviously nil. The solution to equation (22) must therefore hold for γP>1>γ*. 
 
PROPOSITION 10.3: If γ∗>γB, then firms will target insufficient innovation size. 
 
PROOF: From proposition 8, γP<γB and by transitivity γP<γ*. 
 
PROPOSITION 10.4: If γ∗<γΒ, then firms will target an innovation size that is either too small if 
aγ(vP,γP)<C, socially optimal if aγ(vP,γP)=C or too great if aγ(vP,γP)>C with 
() () () () []
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PROOF: Since both γP<γB and γ*<γB, the relation between γP and γ* depends on the specifics of the 
functional form of the innovation and adaptation functions. The private optimum can either 
exceed the social one if aγ(vP,γP) is sufficiently large (i.e. if the change with which the adaptation 
rate increases with innovation size is greater than the critical value C) or lie below it if aγ(vP,γP) 
below the critical value. With minuscule probability, it coincides with the social optimum. 
 
The ambiguity in proposition 10.4 arises because both optima lie to the right of the benchmark 
size. However, they do so for entirely different reasons: The social optimum because it 
internalises the additional effect on adaptation; the private optimum because the individual firm 
does not compete against its own patents and thus receives the total impact of innovation (γ) in 
terms of monopolistic rents rather than the social rewards of the technological differential (γ-1). 
 
The differences between social optimum and private choice highlight the failure of a patent 
driven system to bring about optimal innovation size. This failure also exists in the absence of speed-dependent selection among pathogens (see proposition 8). There it has been suggested to 
modify the patent system in order to align social and private optima. In the cases discussed in 
propositions 10.3 and 10.4 a similar approach may be called for (see below). However, if the 
linkage between innovation size and rate of adaptation is rather extreme such as in propositions 
10.1 and 10.2, the patent system is woefully inadequate by principle. This is the case both under 
the most optimistic form of linkage (delay of response or the “magic bullet”) and the most 
pessimistic (something akin to an “arms race”). In these cases, entirely novel mechanisms of 
rewarding innovation against humanity’s biological competitors have to be devised. Moreover, 
this is also the case if biotechnology could escape the conventional assumptions about decreasing 
returns to innovation as a function of innovation size. 
 
 




Where boundary solutions are socially optimal (such as in propositions 10.1 and 10.2), alternative 
innovation reward systems to patents are required. Where intermediate optima result (such as in 
propositions 10.3 and 10.4), modifications to the patent systems could be envisaged. Possible 
modifications in the absence of adaptations are discussed in (Aghion and Howitt 1998). Here, we 
only highlight some ideas about modifications to the patent system in biotechnology. 
 
Where the crux of the failure of the patent system lies in the imperfect appropriability of rents 
generated by innovations, modifications of patent length and patent breadth can have 
considerable effects (O’Donoghue, Scotchmer and Thisse 1995). Where adaptations are present, 
there are two reasons for rent truncation, namely technological obsolescence due to pathogen 
evolution and commercial obsolescence due to competitors’ innovations. Interestingly, this means 
that at any given point there may be a number of innovations present that although commercially 
obsolete, are still technologically adequate. Patents in these innovations still have a net present 
value to the extent that they may return to commercial viability if a competitor’s product has 
become technologically obsolete (Goeschl and Swanson 2001). However, the since the duration 
of a patent is defined in calendar time, the value of these patents is elapsing continuously, even 
though no monopolistic rent extraction is taking place. It is merely an option on such rents if the 
circumstances allow the product to return to commercial viability. One possible modification in 
this context would then be to define patent length on the basis of commercial life rather than 
calendar time, which could be approximated through cumulative output. 
 
Another instrument works through the definition of “patentable innovations”, i.e. the minimum 
size of an innovation that is required to be considered ‘useful’.34 The rationale is that in order for 
a temporary monopoly to be granted to an innovator, the resultant welfare loss can only be 
tolerated for innovations of at least a certain size. This rationale is also valid in the context of 
biotechnological innovations. Under the conditions that give rise to proposition 10.4 however, if 
private innovation size is excessive, a lowering of the standard of novelty can be appropriate as 
long as the overall social welfare effect of this measure is not negative. On the other hand, this 
contrasts with the possibility arising by virtue of adaptations in pathogens that innovation size 
may too great (see proposition 10.3), implying the need for a maximum size of innovations 
allowed. The policy question is then to establish the conditions under which the two requirements 
have both to be implemented and under which they conflict. This goes beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
 11.2 Alternatives 
 
Whereas in the previous cases, the patent system required adjustment, in the cases established 
under propositions 10.1 and 10.2 the patent system is an entirely inappropriate instrument for 
generating the optimal amount of R&D. In the case of proposition 10.2, innovation should be 
discouraged by withholding rewards to innovators. Even a steady-state that generates innovations 
of the minimum size required on efficiency grounds for a patent system incurs significant 
dynamic losses and is therefore not socially desirable. In the case of proposition 10.1 the patent 
system fails to translate the welfare gains from winning the innovation-adaptation race into 
appropriate incentives for innovation at the firm level. This result is well known from the 
literature on optimal incentives for antibiotics (Goeschl and Swanson 2000), vaccinations 
(Geoffard and Philipson 1997) and new pesticides (Goeschl and Swanson 2001). One response 
with desirable characteristics is to create a prize for successful innovation in order to solve the 




Summarizing the socially optimal management of biotechnological research, there are two areas 
that require regulatory scrutiny. The first area is the amount of investment in biotechnological 
innovations in the light of scale-dependent response by pathogens. The second area is the step 
size of new innovations pursued by in the biotechnological domain in the light of a size-
dependent response by pathogens. 
 
We examined the performance of a patent-driven industry in addressing these two areas of 
concern. The conclusions are that a patent-based system fails in the first area because it induces 
firms to engage in a cyclical pursuit of innovations rather than in a process of growth through 
innovations. In the second area, the requirement of a minimum innovation size in a standard 
patent system aligns social and private decisions only under highly restrictive conditions. 
Modifications to enhance the appropriable share of rents from innovations are required as a 
matter of course. Moreover, in the most serious manifestations of recurrent problems, alternative 
R&D reward systems are required to manage the innovation process. In light of the performance 
in both areas of concern, therefore, the application of a patent-based system of rewarding 
innovations to a sector where recurrence of technological problems is an ineradicable feature is 
arguably not the first-best option. Where the problem of recurrence is most severe, i.e. where 
pathogens have a high exogenous adaptation rate and respond with a significantly increased rate 
of adaptation to increases in innovation size, the failures of a patent system are most serious. This 
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 Table 1: Characteristic time for the appearance of resistance in some specific biological 
systems (from Anderson and May 1991) 
 
 
Species    Control  Agent    Time  to  resistance 
Generations
a
                         Years 
Avian coccidia 
    Eimeria tenella   Buquinolate           6 (<6)        1 
Glycarbylamide                 11 (9)         <1 
Nitrofurazone           12 (5)         7 
Clopidol                  20 (9)         6 
Robenicline           22 (16)              10 
Nicarbazin           35 (17)         27 
Gut nematodes in sheep 
    Haemonchus contortus  Thiabendazole           3           <1 
Cambendazole           (4)          <1 
Ticks on sheep 
    Boophilus microplus  DDT             32            4 
HCH-dieldrin           2           <1 
sodium arsenite                     40 
Black flies (Japan) 
    Simulium aokii   DDT+Lindane                6 
    Simulium damnosum  D D T                  5 
Anopheline mosquitoes (different localities) 
    Anopheles sacharovi   D D T                  4-6 
D i e l d r i n                8 
    An. maculipennis   D D T                  5 
    An. stephansi     D D T                  7 
D i e l d r i n                  5 
    An. culicifacies     D D T                  8-12 
    An. annuaris     D D T                  3-4 
    An. Sundaicus   D D T                  3 
D i e l d r i n                  1-3 
    An. quadrimaculatus   D D T                  2-7 
D i e l d r i n                  2-7 
 
a The figures give the number of generations before a majority (>50 per cent) of the individuals in 
the population are resistance to the control agent. In brackets are the number of generations 
before resistance is first observed (usually >5 per cent of individuals resistant). 
  
Appendix: Derivation of equation (9) 
Derivation of equation (9) 
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The denominator of equation (vi) gives then the effective discount rate applied to the output function. 
Reformulating (vi) for some arbitrary A0 F(x), we arrive at equation (9). 
 
 1 The term originates from Lewis Carroll’s ‘Alice in Wonderland’ where the Red Queen proclaims to Alice that 
“around here, we must run faster and faster, merely to stand still….” 
2 It is possible to claim “Plant Breeders Rights” in new plant varieties under the so-called UPOV convention and/or 
patent rights in genetically modified seeds and animal varieties. 
3 A recent survey found that plant breeders cited pest resistance as the primary focus of their activities. (Swanson and 
Luxmoore 1998) 
4 The literature on seed replacement cycles in agriculture documents a cycle of 3 to 7 years between introductions of 
new pest resistant plant varieties on commercially meaningful scales. (Heisey 1990, Heisey and Brennan 1991). 
5 In the context of agriculture this only implies a proportional increase in the amount of high yielding seed x required 
with an increase in the amount of intensively cultivated land d. 
6  Throughout the text, we follow the convention that derivatives with respect to a variable are indicated by a 
corresponding subscript. 
7 This is a close approximation to reality within the seed industry where there is a crop-specific, but nevertheless linear 
relationship between the land used in seed production and the land sown using this seed. The relative size of b and z is 
in the order of 100:0.1 to 100:5 depending on the crop (Pioneer Seed, personal communications). 
8 The “significance” of a technological innovation is a legal requirement for the acquisition of property rights in the 
innovation. As this is an issue that we will introduce in section 4, we will normalise the magnitude of any technological 
innovation to be equivalent to the magnitude (γ) required for the acquisition of a private property right in that 
innovation. 
9 The industrial organisation literature defines innovations as “drastic” if the technological advantage conferred by the 
innovation is of such a magnitude that the innovating firm captures the entire market when setting the monopoly price. 
Non-drastic innovations force the innovating firm to sell below the monopoly price (Tirole 1988). 
10 This assumption follows the standard literature in crop epidemiology where the emergence of virulence is assumed to 
follow a Poisson process (cf. Zadoks and Schein 1979, Kiyosawa 1986). 
11 This assumption is consistent with both the theory of selection (since those pests with a matching gene for x have a 
relative advantage that increases with the use of x) and the empirical observation that the widespread use of HYVs is 
associated with reduced periods of commercial viability. 
12 We can re-write this as λa(d) making use of equation (3) where λ is a parameter which measures successful mutation 
or recombination of the pathogen population and a, a’<0 measures the adaptive response rate of biological competitors 
relative to size of intensive agriculture once a successful mutation has occurred. 
13 For an analysis of the situation in which adaptation may be dampened by the simultaneous use of many different 
production methods, see Goeschl and Swanson (2000b). 
14 Modellers of the dynamics of evolutionary games view resistance as the accumulation of “matching genes” within 
the pest population, where such matches enable the pest to prey on the host. A biological innovation in this context 
would consist of a change from a paucity to the relative prevalence of such a matching gene throughout the current pest 
population. 
15 This assumption represents a uniform metric of a continuous process of depreciation. The unit of analysis is fixed 
within the technological sector (by the requirement that a patentable innovation be significant). 
16 It is important to notice a subtlety here in that the discrete nature of the Poisson process introduces two “time scales” 
into the system. One is natural time, denoted by t, while s denotes the productivity stage of the economy. 
17 One benefit of choosing this functional form for this problem is that it implies no bias in favour of intergenerational 
transfers of utility. (see Barrett 1992 for a discussion in the context of biodiversity). 
18 This reduces the own discount rate since new technologies shift the production set outwards and relax the budget 
constraint. 
19 In this instance the innate growth capacity of the biological resource – pests and pathogens – detracts from available 
consumption, and so increases the own discount rate. 
20 This is essentially the case of potential collapse investigated by Weitzman (2000). 
21 A stationary solution to the problem is to be expected on account of the linearity of the objective function. 
22 Recall that a’<0. 
23 The result is discussed in more detail in comparison to the private market solution in section 5.7. 
24 This assumption is not essential to the argument, but simplifies the analysis. It is also not an unrealistic assumption in 
the context of agricultural lands, where it is highly likely that there is a single most productive use of most arable lands 
and a single monopolist of the intermediate goods (HYVs) requisite for that use. 
25 In other papers, the issue of strategic shelving of patents in situations where technologies degrade over time is taken 
up (Goeschl and Swanson 2000, Mason and Swanson 2000). 
26 There is a subtlety in (14), (15) and (16): Since s=I-D, the pay-off from delivering the next innovation depends on 
the history of biological adaptations which have occurred since the last technological innovation. Strictly peaking, the 
NPV of the next technological innovation, VI+1  , is the expected value of monopoly rents based on a probability 
distribution over s. This is because the flow of profits p is directly affected by the current level of productivity As. 
which is a joint outcome of both technological and biological processes. The present value thus decreases if pathogen 
adaptations have occurred. But if the price of land is allowed to change within technological stages, then the fact that 
marginal productivity will decreases at exactly the same moment at which a biological adaptation occurs means that the relationship between land prices and private R&D is unaffected by pathogen adaptation since the real cost of R&D 
(measured in terms of the cost of land) does not change. 
27 Since the LHS is increasing in v and the RHS is decreasing in v for F’” =0 (sufficient condition), the equilibrium will 
be unique assuming this restriction on F’”. 
28 The effect of the rate of biological innovation requires a qualification in that it holds only as long as the discount rate 
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If this condition does not hold, it would mean that land in R&D is the most competitive opportunity to generate welfare 
available in the economy. We would therefore generally expect this condition to hold. 
29 In fact, there are two effects at work, one as mentioned above, the other decreasing the expected value of innovations. 
But 
the latter is only a second-order effect which is dominated by the first as the partial derivatives show. 
30 The only qualification on this result is that if the reserve sector has a higher intrinsic growth rate than all other sectors 
in the economy that have impact on consumption, then a higher arrival rate of biological innovations frees up resources 
to be put to final goods production. 
31 The second condition is the limit case. If it does not hold, it either implies the pursuit of innovations of very large size 
or of infinitely large innovations by society (or firms on its behalf) if there is no optimal point. See the further 
discussion, 
32 A convex relationship between likelihood of innovation and innovation size is not very realistic as it would suggest 
the greater innovations would be relatively cheaper. This is therefore not explored here. 
33 If assumption 1 does not hold, e.g. because the rate of response is determined by the last innovation, then an 
interdependence between the value of the patent and the choice of innovation size arises. This will lead to a partial 
internalization of the innovation size effect by the innovating firm. In the case of a’(.)<0, this would lead to a decrease 
in the target size. In the opposite case, such as winnability, the effect is ambiguous: The first-order effect, effectively 
lengthening the patent duration, would encourage an increase in patent size. The second-order effect in the case of 
winnability is the positive effect of eradication of pathogens on the expected returns on patents for all competitors, thus 
shortening the length of the patent duration due to increased R&D activitity and the resulting higher rate of creative 
destruction in the industry. 
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